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Abstract—The privacy implications of third-party tracking
is a well-studied problem. Recent research has shown that
besides data aggregators and behavioral advertisers, online social
networks also act as trackers via social widgets. Existing cookie
policies are not enough to solve these problems, pushing users
to employ blacklist-based browser extensions to prevent such
tracking. Unfortunately, such approaches require maintaining
and distributing blacklists, which are often too general and
adversely affect non-tracking services for advertisements and
analytics. In this paper, we propose and advocate for a general
third-party cookie policy that prevents third-party tracking
with cookies and preserves the functionality of social widgets
without requiring a blacklist and adversely affecting non-tracking
services. We implemented a proof-of-concept of our policy as
browser extensions for Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome. To
date, our extensions have been downloaded about 11.8K times
and have over 2.8K daily users combined.
I. INTRODUCTION
To obtain extended web analytics (e.g., user demographics,
other sites visited), web publishers often outsource the collec-
tion of analytics information to third-party data aggregators.
These aggregators may also provide behavioral advertisements
that are tailored to a user’s interests based on his/her brows-
ing history. Similarly, publishers also embed social widgets
provided by online social network (OSN) providers (e.g.,
Facebook Like) on their sites to increase user engagement
and the site’s exposure to other users. Aggregators and OSN
providers also benefit from this setup: they obtain vast amounts
of information about users’ browsing behavior across the web
and use this information via targeted advertisements [3].
Unfortunately, these actions come with a price for user pri-
vacy and raise concerns about users being tracked on the web.
This tracking enables these third parties to compile detailed
behavior of individual users with the sensitive information they
obtain [32]. Thus, these parties are given a lot of information
about users’ actions on the web and have to be trusted not to
abuse it. This trust has been violated in the past [6, 16, 17].
Existing cookie policies in modern browsers offer a partial
solution to this problem. A user can select a cookie policy, in
which the browser will not allow any third-party cookies to
be set. While effective at preventing tracking for behavioral
advertisements, this policy causes issues when the third party
is an OSN provider. For example, Firefox’s “Never accept third
party cookies” policy breaks the functionality of social widgets
on publisher sites and does not allow a user to interact with
them, even when the user is logged in to the OSN that provided
the widgets. Chrome and Safari behave the same way.
Another privacy option in Firefox aims to solve exactly this
problem, such that cookies from third parties will be accepted
if the user has visited the third party site as a first party in
the past.1 For example, if the user is logged in to Facebook,
all Facebook Like buttons on other publishers will function
properly. This option, however, allows the OSN provider to act
as a tracker and learn about the user’s visit to the publisher,
even if the user did not interact with the social widget [25, 32].
Tools, such as Priv3 [12, 25] and ShareMeNot [19, 32], aim
to prevent this tracking by OSN providers.
Following these tools, other popular client-side privacy
tools like Ghostery [4] and Disconnect [2] started preventing
social widgets from being loaded, in addition to the trackers by
data aggregators. Using a blacklist of aggregators, behavioral
advertisers and OSN providers, these tools scan the loading
page and prevent blacklisted elements from being loaded.
This blacklist-based approach has several limitations. First
of all, the blacklist needs to be maintained and then distributed
to clients in a timely fashion; otherwise, the benefits of using
such a tool are greatly reduced. These tools try to find an
optimum update schedule for their tracker libraries. For ex-
ample, Ghostery regularly updates its library of trackers while
Disconnect checks for updates every day. Other less popular
tools like Priv3 and ShareMeNot support only a handful of
third parties, and depend on their developers to keep up with
new social widgets. This maintenance of the blacklist can be
cumbersome and error-prone: there is no guarantee that all
third-party trackers will always be included in the blacklist.
In addition, such a blacklist may be bypassed by third
parties, simply with a configuration trick at their servers. For
example, Apache2 directive ‘AliasMatch’ [9] enables a third
party to serve the blacklisted element (i.e., JavaScript file,
social widget) via customizable URLs, such that each publisher
uses a different source, yet the third party serves the same file.2
This trick would force the tools to blacklist entire domains,
which can become problematic if legitimate files not related
to tracking are also served (e.g., libraries, images, OSN site).
Finally, these blacklists are very broad: They include first-
party analytics tools, such as Piwik, Open Web Analytics
and Mint Analytics [8, 10, 11], preventing publishers from
learning about their users’ behavior on their own sites. They
also include non-behavioral advertising that, by definition, does
not require the tracking of users across the web (e.g., Project
1Similar to Safari’s “block cookies from third parties and advertisers”.
2Demo available at https://nta.mpi-sws.org/test2/test.html
Wonderful). As a result, publishers who choose more privacy-
friendly solutions for analytics and advertisements by not using
third-party tracking are being unnecessarily penalized. While
such non-tracking services can be removed from the blacklist,
the maintenance issue is only amplified: the tool provider now
has to categorize and determine which solutions are acceptable.
Privacy Badger from EFF [15] and Lightbeam from Firefox
[7] dynamically track the third parties the browser is contact-
ing. Privacy Badger aims to detect and block third parties that
appear to be tracking the user without his/her consent. If the
content is deemed necessary for the page, cookies are removed
from these requests. Privacy Badger uses the same blacklist as
ShareMeNot for OSN sites, and the interaction with the widget
is blocked if not manually overridden. Lightbeam visualizes
the third parties, which the user can block manually, but such
blocking breaks the functionality of the widgets.
In this paper, we propose and advocate that modern
browsers should implement a general cookie policy, such that
third-party cookies will only be sent when and if the user
interacts with the third party content. This policy supports
social networking features when the user wants them, striking
a balance between user engagement for publishers and privacy
for users. This policy is general, because there is no blacklist
to maintain, and thus, it is free of the above problems. Finally,
this policy is also effective in preventing third-party tracking
via cookies without punishing web analytics and advertising
platforms that do not track users across the web.
The next section presents our goals. We list our assump-
tions in Section III. Section IV explains our design and how it
achieves our goals. We describe our implementation in Section
V, and discuss our policy’s implications in Section VI. We
conclude with future work in Section VII.
II. GOALS
We advocate that the users should be the final decision
makers with regards to tracking by third parties, be they data
aggregators or OSNs. Specifically, we would like our policy
to enable interactive features (i.e., social widgets) in an on-
demand fashion. Like previous approaches [12, 25, 32], we
think that user interaction is necessary to achieve balance for
privacy and functionality for a social web.
At the same time, we would like to devise a general cookie
policy for third parties to prevent third-party tracking by not
only OSNs but also data aggregators and advertisers. This
policy should not depend on a blacklist unlike the above tools;
thus, it should not require the cooperation of a developer to
maintain and distribute such a blacklist to protect user privacy.
Finally, our policy should not interfere with non-tracking
services for analytics and advertisements, and penalize pub-
lishers using such arguably more privacy-friendly services. We
recognize the fact that for a sustainable web, publishers need
statistical data about their users to improve their services as
well as advertisements to financially support their operations.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
We consider any content that is not loaded from the first
party domain as third party content. Such content can include
social widgets from OSN providers as well as advertisements.
We assume that the cookie preferences reflect the users’
intentions and that the third parties are not going to try to
bypass them. In a recent example, Doubleclick was caught
deliberately circumventing Safari’s default policy, and got
sued by the Federal Trade Commission [5]. We assume such
attempts are frowned upon, if not illegal, and the attempting
party risks its reputation. We think that the data aggregators
providing voluntary opt-out mechanisms already show their
good faith in this regard, and that this assumption is reasonable.
More specifically, we leave methods to circumvent user
cookie preferences outside our scope. One such method is fin-
gerprinting, in which a third party creates a unique signature of
a user’s browser by combining various pieces of information in
the browser environment, such as plugins, fonts and resolution.
This fingerprint is then used to track the user across websites
[26, 28] without storing any cookies on the user’s device.
With the prevalence of such practices increasing [21, 22, 30],
potential defenses are already being researched [29].
Another method outside our scope is ‘cookie synching’
[1, 20]. In cookie synching, publishers share first-party cookie
values of their users with third parties, by embedding a
resource request to the third party with the first-party cookie
values as parameters, enabling the third parties to set their own
cookies. As a result, they can establish a mapping between the
received cookie values and the cookie values they set, such that
the user’s browsing behavior can be correlated.
Finally, we assume that mashups, sites with data and code
from multiple publishers, are interactive. If not, we assume
that they will continue to function without the third parties
receiving user-specific data (i.e., cookies). For example, most
mashups using the Google Maps API still function if the user
is not logged in to Google.
IV. DESIGN
To achieve our goals, we propose the following policy:
Any content from a third party domain (e.g., social widgets,
advertisements) should be loaded without the associated (third-
party) cookies. This content will be reloaded with the associ-
ated cookies, when (and if) the user interacts with it.
Reload-on-click: We define user interaction as the mouse click
to a page element. Although other events such as hovering over
an element or key presses can also constitute user interaction,
we think that a click covers a big portion of user interactions
with content. Other approaches also use a click as an indication
of user intent to interact with social widgets [4, 12, 19].
Our previous work with other collaborators, Priv3, showed
that reloading social widgets after the user click is effective
for enabling social features on a website without compromising
user privacy for functionality [12, 25]. For example, when the
user wants to click the Facebook Like button on a page, it is
reloaded by sending the user’s Facebook cookies. Our current
work enhances this approach with two new mechanisms.
Two-click control: After the third-party content is initially
loaded without sending the user’s cookies, we use a two-
click control. The first click enables the third-party content
by reloading the third-party content with the user’s cookies.
The second click registers the original action. For example,
when the Facebook Like button is reloaded after the (first)
user click, it shows information about the friends of the user
who also liked that page. If the user wants to like the page,
the second click will register the action. In this case, Facebook
knows about the user’s visit to that page after the first click
(i.e., activation of the widget). Enabling widgets in this manner
still provides functionality, but at the same time, allows OSN
users not interested in using the social widgets to have more
control over when OSNs can learn about their browsing.
Generalization: In contrast to previous approaches, our policy
does not require a blacklist: it is applied to any third party con-
tent. Detecting such content is a straightforward task similar
to the same origin policy already employed by browsers (§V).
Besides social widgets, our policy is also effective in
preventing other third party tracking via cookies: the user
cannot interact with ‘invisible’ elements (e.g., pixel tags,
invisible iframes) that are used for behavioral advertising and
data aggregation purposes. As a result, cookies associated with
these third parties will never be sent, preventing them from
tracking the user across the web. These elements do not need
to be detected at runtime or enumerated in advance as in a
blacklist, because the policy applies to any third-party content.
Finally, our policy does not interfere with first-party ana-
lytics tools, because these tools use cookies that belong to the
first-party domain whose requests are not modified. Similarly,
this policy does not interfere with non-tracking (i.e., non-
behavioral) advertisement systems, which by definition do not
use any tracking cookies to load advertisements.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a proof-of-concept of our proposed policy
as browser extensions. Our implementation, Priv3+, is avail-
able for Firefox [13] and Chrome [14]. To date, it has been
downloaded about 11.8K times and has over 2.8K daily users.
Detecting third-party requests and removing cookies: When
a page is being loaded, our tool intercepts HTTP GET requests
for the resources embedded in the page. Requests to the first-
party domain are let through unchanged with their cookies.
Requests for a resource from a third-party domain are only let
through after removing the cookie values. These cookies are
still present in the browser (i.e., they are not deleted), and used
when the user interacts with the third-party content.
Third-party cookie access: Strictly speaking, our policy does
not prevent third parties from setting cookies on the user’s
browser. One caveat of this approach is that they can receive
these cookies later, if the user visits the third party site as a
first party. This issue opens the possibility of the third party
accumulating the browsing history of the user by setting its
cookies and hoping the user visits its website. Although the
probability of a user visiting a tracker’s website may be low,
this issue becomes more important if the third party is an OSN.
As in the original Priv3 implementation [12, 25], Priv3+
prevents third-party scripts from accessing cookie values until
the user interaction. As a result, third parties cannot use scripts
to compile a list of visited pages in the cookie values to receive
them later. We think that refusing new third-party cookies can
also solve this problem, but have not implemented this feature.
Social widgets versus advertisements: The lack of the black-
list forced us to develop a heuristic to distinguish between
advertisement networks (where a click needs to be passed
unchanged) and social widgets (which require a reload). The
social widgets in a publisher website are usually loaded in
a sandboxed container such as an iframe to prevent security
issues. For example, social widgets from Facebook, Google
and Twitter as well as commenting platforms, such as Disqus,
are loaded in a single iframe. The user click simply triggers
the reload of this iframe. This approach is different than other
client-side tools, such as Ghostery, which requires the user to
reload the entire page rather than a single element.
Similar to social widgets, third-party advertisements are
also loaded within iframes. For clicked advertisements, the
click is processed without reloading the container. During user
interaction, the two cases are distinguished using a heuristic:
an advertisement is usually present in nested iframes due to the
real-time ad auction process and multiple redirections, whereas
a social widget is contained within only one iframe.
Limitations: Our biggest limitation is that our heuristic may
fail to distinguish a social widget and an advertisement loaded
in a single (i.e., non-nested) iframe. A user click on the
advertisement will trigger a reload, which may have an adverse
effect such as creating an extra impression that otherwise
would not have occurred. More importantly, the click on the
advertisement may not register creating an undesired behavior.
We plan to further investigate how prevalent this issue is.
Preliminary performance evaluation: We created user pro-
files in Firefox for each existing cookie policy as well as
Priv3+. We visited up to 10 random pages from each of the
top 1K sites from a snapshot of Quantcast top sites [18] from
November 2014 for a total of 7,257 pages and recorded the
load times. On average, Priv3+ adds 3.94% overhead compared
with the default policy of accepting all third party cookies. Not
accepting third party cookies and accepting third party cookies
from visited sites add 1.73% and 1.32% overhead, respectively.
Miscellaneous: Priv3+ shows information about the third
parties present in a web page. It can highlight different types
of third-party content (e.g., content that had cookies, content
that had no cookies). The user can create a whitelist of third
parties to be loaded with cookies and on which publishers.
VI. DISCUSSION
Reloading advertisement iframes with cookies: One can
argue that a clicked advertisement shows the user’s intention to
interact with the advertiser, and thus, the advertisement iframe
should be reloaded. This approach has the following problems:
First, it is not clear which iframe to reload because there may
be multiple, nested iframes. Reloading the parent may generate
a different child iframe containing another advertisement less
relevant to the user. Some iframes do not have their ‘src’ prop-
erty set preventing the reload. Most importantly, reloading may
have adverse effects for the advertisers, triggering new auctions
and double-charging for impressions and clicks. For these
reasons, we pass the click to an advertisement unchanged.
Evercookies: Evercookies use storage vectors (e.g., Flash
cookie store) [21], which are not deleted when the browser
cookies are cleared. Trackers exploit these storage vectors
to respawn old cookie values to achieve a longer persisting
tracking period. Our policy would prevent these respawned
cookies to be sent to third parties without user interaction.
Cookie synching: Our policy partially prevents cookie synch-
ing that uses previously set (third-party) cookies. The cookie
access mechanism may prevent other methods like using first-
party cookie values as parameters for third-party resources.
Behavioral advertisements & extended web analytics: Our
policy prevents third-party tracking used for behavioral adver-
tisements, which may be deemed necessary for a sustainable
web. A byproduct of this tracking is extended web analytics, in
which the aggregators can provide visitor demographics. There
have been multiple efforts to provide behavioral advertising
that is privacy-preserving and comparable to today’s systems
[27, 31, 33]. Similarly, previous research shows how the same
aggregate information can be obtained without violating user
privacy [23, 24]. We think these efforts as well as our policy
are steps in the right direction to provide essential services for
a sustainable web without compromising user privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We proposed and advocated a general, interaction-based
third-party cookie policy. With our policy, third party content
is loaded without sending associated third-party cookies, ef-
fectively preventing tracking by OSNs, data aggregators and
behavioral advertisers. This policy strikes a balance between
functionality of social networking and privacy by requiring
user interaction to reload the social widgets with cookies when
the user wants. Our policy is general and does not depend
on a blacklist, automatically solving problems associated with
maintenance, distribution and circumvention of the blacklist.
Finally, it supports non-tracking analytics and advertisement
services and does not penalize publishers who use these
more privacy-friendly tools. Ideally, we would like our policy
implemented and supported in major browsers.
Future work includes studying if our policy causes any
adverse effects. First, we will expand our performance evalu-
ation with more sites and compare our page load times with
blacklist-based tools, which can prevent loading a blacklisted
element and save time. Second, we will devise a method-
ology to quantify our policy’s effects on rendered pages
and determine if these effects lead to functionality issues.
Advertisements, customization and changing content can cause
differences making this task complex. We plan to compensate
for these differences by comparing the structure of the pages
(i.e., DOM tree). Finally, we hope to gather more users and
obtain their feedback, which will help us better understand how
users perceive and treat different types of third-party content.
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